Distributed C2 in the cockpit will be enabled through the use of software and AI to assist pilots’ decision-making by accessing and sorting through massive data, via satellite communications. To meet this dual challenge, this paper advocates that Battle Management, extended to multi-domains, should be conducted at all levels and when necessary down to the fighter aircraft. It is now almost exclusively provided at command centres level such as Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) and Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in a centralized mode, except for battle management which can be delegated to AWACS-like platforms.įurther accelerating the decision-making necessitates both the introduction of greater subsidiarity in the decision-making chain in a decentralized mode, and the provision of adequate decision support to the authority vested with C2 responsibility. C2 is a process of implementing several decision loops in service of a strategy. The aim is twofold: regaining decision-making agility in terms of responsiveness and quality, as well as understanding and redefining the place of humans with regards to new information technologies. This new environment, with its increasingly time-constrained and complex decision-making, calls for a strong adaptation of today’s C2 model. Increasing Decisional Agility with Meaningful Human Control In such complex environments, complying with the ethical framework requires human involvement to ensure moral responsibility when manned and unmanned systems operate together. Hence, the scope of operations needs to be increasingly comprehensive, by considering all possible direct and collateral consequences of kinetic effects in terms of physical and psychological impacts.
The aim is not only to win the war but also the peace which follows. Maintaining a certain level of ‘cleanliness’ in military operations requires an increasingly complex legal framework often difficult to translate into realistic and efficient operational guidance. This is the prerequisite to keeping public support. Dealing with these threats in largescale operations requires the parallel execution of many missions, as well as the simultaneous processing of huge amounts of data.įurthermore, NATO Air Forces are also operating in more complex environments, as the need to avoid collateral damage and fratricide casualties remains the same. This results in a decreasing amount of time available to execute a kill chain. New threats are becoming increasingly agile and difficult to discriminate from their environment. The increased likelihood of simultaneously facing peer or near-peer and asymmetrical opponents is imposing greater time constraints on NATO Air Forces. Adjusting to New Threats and Resulting Constraints 2 This ‘technological, doctrinal and ethical triptych‘ lies at the heart of any future combat Air system.
BEING LOOPY MEANING FULL
Harnessing their full potential will require a doctrinal transformation, whilst ensuring adequate and meaningful human control. O’Shaughnessy, USAF (ret.), ‘machine- enabled insights … can identify anomalous events, anticipate what will happen next, and generate options with associated repercussions and risks.’ 1 This goes beyond implementing new cutting-edge technologies. Contrary to past C2 approaches, the novelty lies in enriched data approaches where software, Artificial Intelligence (AI), a utomation, and satellite communication will bypass human limitations. Distributed decision-making is key to NATO doctrine. Providing the right information in the right place at the right time will improve decision making in terms of speed and quality along the C2 cycles from the Air Component Command (ACC) to the tactical edge. A more favoured approach is to speed up the information flow, between manned and unmanned platforms in varying sophistication, by linking fused sensor data to the most appropriate Command and Control (C2) authority. Relying on the sole procurement of ever-increasing sophisticated fighter aircraft will only further r educe their numbers and availability.
Such challenges require a paradigm shift. The proliferation of military capabilities, due to lower technological entry barriers, is leading to more denied environments, and spreading conflicts are overstretching NATO Air Forces. When facing such threats, two main trends can be observed. This is accompanied by a continued presence of asymmetrical conventional threats from rogue or failing states, or terrorist organizations. The playing field is being levelled due to an increasing number of peer and near-peer threats from resurging and emerging potential opponents. In light of today’s uncertainties, there is a shared realization that NATO’s Air supremacy which has underpinned military operations since the 1980s is no longer a given.
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